We study a model of collective real-time decision-making (or learning) in a social network operating in an uncertain environment, for which no a priori probabilistic model is available. Instead, the environment's impact on the agents in the network is seen through a sequence of cost functions, revealed to the agents in a causal manner only after all the relevant actions are taken. There are two kinds of costs: individual costs incurred by each agent and local-interaction costs incurred by each agent and its neighbors in the social network. Moreover, agents have inertia: each agent has a default mixed strategy that stays fixed regardless of the state of the environment, and must expend effort to deviate from this strategy in order to respond to cost signals coming from the environment. We construct a decentralized strategy, wherein each agent selects its action based only on the costs directly affecting it and on the decisions made by its neighbors in the network. In this setting, we quantify social learning in terms of regret, which is given by the difference between the realized network performance over a given time horizon and the best performance that could have been achieved in hindsight by a fictitious centralized entity with full knowledge of the environment's evolution. We show that our strategy achieves the regret that scales sublinearly with the time horizon and polylogarithmically with the number of agents and the maximum number of neighbors of any agent in the social network.
Introduction

Risk vs. uncertainty in social learning and optimization
Decision-making and optimization based on information dispersed among a large number of agents are topics of significant current interest, from both theoretical and practical points of view. Existing literature, which is vast, covers a wide variety of models with different assumptions on the information structure, i.e., who is allowed to observe what, and on the agents' capabilities, i.e., what they are allowed to or able to do with their observations. For example, canonical models of Bayesian learning [1] assume complete and truthful sharing of all relevant information among all agents, who are also endowed with essentially unlimited computational power. There are also generalizations to noisy signals, but it is typically assumed that the source of noise is nonadversarial. A related framework of Bayesian dynamic games [2, 3] considers sequential decisions by a large collection of agents, where each agent has perfect recall of all decisions made in the past (but not necessarily of all information used to arrive at those decisions).
Recently, however, emphasis has shifted towards decision-making in social networks, where information sharing is limited to small groups of agents -e.g., when an individual is deciding whether to buy a particular product, she can directly observe similar decisions made by her friends, neighbors or coworkers. Thus, a social network can be modeled as a graph, where each vertex corresponds to an agent while edges correspond to pairwise interactions between agents [4] . Most theoretical studies of social decision-making rest on the following basic framework [1, 4] : (i) there is some unknown parameter associated with the environment in which the network is situated; (ii) each agent receives a private signal stochastically related to this parameter; and (iii) agents select actions by aggregating their private signals with any information they receive from their neighbors in the social network. The main question is whether the agents can learn enough about this parameter of interest under the given information structure and the constraints on their information-processing capabilities. For instance, Acemoglu et al. [5] consider Bayesian learning in dynamic social networks with randomly evolving neighborhoods, while Jadbabaie et al. [6] examine a non-Bayesian model of learning in a fixed network, where agents form their beliefs about the underlying parameter by mixing Bayesian updates computed on the basis of their private information with the beliefs of their neighbors.
There are several key modeling assumptions underlying these and similar works:
(S1) The environment is static, meaning that the underlying parameter is drawn from a fixed probability distribution once and for all, and does not change throughout the learning process.
(S2) Each agent has a coherent probabilistic model of the environment in the form of a joint probability measure on the Cartesian product of the parameter space and the agent's private signal space.
(S3) The agents have no intrinsic goals or default strategies unrelated to the state of the environment.
In this paper, we introduce a model of discrete-time decision-making in social networks that departs from all three of these assumptions. In particular, our setting has the following features:
(D1) The environment is dynamic, and no agent has a model of its evolution.
(D2) In view of the item above, the environment does not admit a probabilistic representation. Instead, at each time step, each agent receives a signal that quantifies the costs of all possible actions that could be taken by this agent and its neighbors in the social network in the current state of the environment.
(D3) No agent is compelled to take only those actions that would entail lower costs. Instead, each agent has a default mixed strategy that stays fixed regardless of the state of the environment, and must expend effort in order to deviate from this strategy.
The distinction between the probabilistic (or Bayesian) view of the environment stipulated in S1-S2 and the nonprobabilistic view laid out in D1-D2 is along the same lines as the distinction between risk and uncertainty made in 1921 by Frank Knight [7] . According to Knight, risk describes situations with outcomes modeled by random variables with known probability distributions, while uncertainty pertains to situations in which no such probabilistic description is available or even possible. For instance, uncertainty may arise due to the presence of boundedly rational agents with different sets of values, norms, and abilities. Despite the clear conceptual and practical significance of this distinction, there has been little effort in economics to formalize it mathematically. One of the few exceptions is the work of Bewley [8, 9] , who studies the behavior of a decision-making agent interacting in real time with an environment in a state of punctuated equilibrium -i.e., intervals of (relative) stability are interrupted by "shocks," corresponding to sharp and unpredictable changes. The Knightian aspect is embodied in the premise that the agent is unable to anticipate the frequency and the nature of these shocks in advance, and so may be caught by surprise. An ideal Bayesian risk-minimizing agent, on the other hand, is not really surprised by anything, since by definition it has already assigned subjective beliefs and utilities to all possible contingencies. Moreover, a Knightian agent may exhibit inertia, i.e., a tendency to stick to some default strategy unless there is a sufficiently strong signal from the environment compelling the agent to deviate from the status quo. Thus, we are interested in the collective decision-making (or learning) capabilities of social networks in the presence of Knightian uncertainty, as captured by the assumptions D1-D3. We quantify learning in terms of regret, i.e., the difference between the realized performance of the network over a given time horizon and the best performance that could have been achieved in hindsight by a fictitious centralized entity with full knowledge of the environment's evolution. The performance criterion is induced by a time-varying sequence of composite objective functions that incorporate the total cost of actions taken by all the agents and the total effort expended by the agents in deviating from their individual default strategies.
A sketch of the model and a summary of results
Let us give a more formal description. We start by considering a single agent who must choose an action from a finite set of alternatives, while attempting to balance the instantaneous cost of that action against a desire to minimize effort by sticking to some default (or status quo) behavior. Mathematically, we may model such an agent as follows. Let X denote the set of all possible actions, and let µ 0 be a fixed probability distribution on X, where for each x ∈ X we interpret µ 0 (x) as the default probability that the agent will choose action x. (For instance, we may imagine a large population of similar agents and take µ 0 (x) as the fraction of agents that tend to choose action x by default.) Without loss of generality, we may suppose that µ 0 (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X. Now let f : X → R be a function that prescribes the cost of each action. If we allow the agent to randomize, then a reasonable strategy for the agent would be to choose a random action according to
where P (X) is the space of all probability distributions on X,
is the expected cost of a random action sampled from the set X according to ν ∈ P (X),
is the relative entropy (or Kullback-Leibler divergence 1 ) between ν and µ 0 [10] , and β > 0 is a parameter that controls the trade-off between loss aversion (i.e., the desire to minimize expected cost) and inertia (i.e., the desire to stick to default behavior) of a Knightian decision-maker [8] . A simple argument based on the method of Lagrange multipliers gives an explicit form of the solution π:
where Z (β) = µ 0 , exp(−β f ) is a normalization factor. This strategy is well-known in econometrics under the name of multinomial logit choice model [11] . Probability distributions of this form are also wellknown in statistical physics under the name of Gibbs measures (see Section 1.4 for more details), where f plays the role of an energy function and β is the inverse temperature. Note, in particular, the two extreme regimes: when β = 0 (infinite temperature), the cost f has no influence on the agent, and we have π = µ 0 ; on the other hand, as β → ∞ (zero temperature), the agent has no inertia, and π will converge to the uniform distribution supported on the set of minimizers of f . Now, let us bring in an element of time and consider a boundedly rational agent operating in a dynamic environment. Bounded rationality comes from the fact that the agent is unable (or unwilling) to construct an intelligible model of its environment, in the spirit of Knightian uncertainty. The agent must take a sequence of random actions X 1 , . . . , X T ∈ X at discrete time steps t = 1, 2, . . . , T . We suppose also that, at each time t , the costs of each action change unpredictably, and the agent only finds out the current cost function f t : X → R after having taken the action X t . However, the agent keeps track of all past cost functions f 1 , . . . , f t −1 , and may use this information when choosing X t . We assume that the environment is nonreactive, i.e., the sequence f 1 , . . . , f T of instantaneous cost functions is fixed in advance.
Finally, we assume that the default distribution µ 0 over the action set X does not change.
More formally, let π t ∈ P (X) denote the distribution of X t chosen by the agent based on all available information at time t . Then, the instantaneous loss incurred by the agent at time t is given by
Due to the agent's limited forecasting ability, we adopt a backward-looking optimality criterion based on worst-case regret: If the cost functions f t are chosen from some fixed class F known to the agent, the agent should choose a strategy (i.e., a rule for mapping all available information at each time t to a probability distribution π t of X t ) so as to minimize the worst-case regret
where
is the regret with respect to a fixed sequence f T = ( f 1 , . . . , f T ) of instantaneous costs. The regret quantifies the worst-case gap between the cumulative loss after T time steps and the smallest cumulative loss that could have been achieved in hindsight had the agent been aware of the entire sequence f T = ( f 1 , . . . , f T ) of instantaneous costs ahead of time.
Online decision or prediction problems have received a great deal of attention in such fields as machine learning, operations research, and finance [12] [13] [14] [15] . Their origins date back to a seminal paper of Hannan [16] , who has shown that an agent making repeated decisions in a dynamic and uncertain environment will eventually "learn" to act almost as well as if it were aware of the sequence of environment states before beginning to act. However, our main interest here is in a setting where the decisions are made by a social network consisting of n agents. This setting has the following salient characteristics: (i) Each agent takes actions in a finite base action space {1, . . . , q}, so the action space X of the entire network is a Cartesian product {1, . . . , q} n . Both the number of alternatives q and the number of agents n are potentially very large.
(ii) The cost functions f t ∈ F decompose into sums of one-and two-variable "local" terms, where each q-ary variable is associated with a separate agent. Thus, when each agent chooses an action, this action affects not only this agent, but also its neighbors in the social network.
(iii) Each of the n agents receives only local information both from other agents and from the environment.
Our main contribution is a construction of a decentralized strategy that takes into account these features and whose regret is sublinear in the time horizon T and polylogarithmic in the network parameters (the number of agents and the maximum neighborhood size). We first develop a centralized strategy and analyze its regret (2) with respect to a class F of cost functions that decompose into individual (per-agent) and pairwise costs, where the latter affect only those agents that are neighbors in the social network. Our first result (Theorem 1) gives an explicit bound on the regret of this strategy. One interesting feature of this strategy is that the effect of past costs is discounted at an exponential rate, so that, at each time step, the probability of each action profile is largely determined by the most recent state of the environment. We then develop an approximate decentralized implementation of this centralized strategy using ideas from statistical physics (specifically, the well-known Glauber dynamics or the Gibbs sampler [17] [18] [19] ). It should be pointed out that decentralized strategies based on the Glauber dynamics have been studied in the literature on economics [20] [21] [22] and on evolutionary dynamics [23] in the context of convergence to equilibrium in large systems consisting of interconnected agents with local interactions. Our second result (Theorem 2) states that, under certain regularity conditions involving the inverse temperature (or inertia) parameter β, the size and maximum degree of the social network, and the exponential discount rate, the regret of the decentralized strategy based on the Glauber dynamics also exhibits favorable scaling as a function of T and network parameters. The proof of Theorem 2 relies on the aforementioned ideas from statistical physics, as well as on some recent developments in the theory of Markov chains -specifically, on Ollivier's notion of a positive Ricci curvature of a Markov chain on a complete separable metric space [24] . A comparison of the centralized regret bound of Theorem 1 and its decentralized counterpart in Theorem 2 sheds light on the price of decentralization in online discrete optimization problems.
Related literature
The most closely related work to ours is a recent paper by Gamarnik et al. [25] , which studies decentralized combinatorial optimization of a random locally decomposable objective function and shows that, under a certain correlation decay condition similar to Dobrushin's uniqueness condition from statistical physics (see, e.g., [26, Section V.1]), it is possible to construct polynomial-time approximation schemes relying only on local information. However, that work is concerned exclusively with static (or offline) optimization problems, in which the objective function is fixed. On the other hand, just as in [25] , we assume that the instantaneous network costs f 1 , . . . , f T decompose into a sum of individual and pairwise interaction terms, and at each time step each agent is informed only about its own cost and the pairwise costs in its immediate neighborhood. Another difference with [25] is that they allow interaction not only between any pair of immediate neighbors in the graph, but also between agents connected by paths of a given length r ≥ 1. By contrast, we follow the rest of the social network literature and allow direct interaction only between neighbors; however, there are also indirect information paths that affect the scaling of the regret. Finally, the connection between the correlation decay conditions in [25] and statistical physics is primarily qualitative, whereas our regularity condition stated in Theorem 2, as well as the technique used in the proof of the theorem, are more directly related to ideas from statistical physics.
There is also extensive literature on regret minimization in multiagent games, e.g., [27] [28] [29] [30] , and in particular in graphical games [31] (a class of games, in which the payoff structure is aligned with the social network governing the agents' interactions). However, in this line of work, regret minimization is a goal of each individual agent, who views the rest of the network as a potential opponent. A typical result is that, provided each agent follows a suitable regret-minimizing strategy, the empirical distribution of the actions converges to some equilibrium (e.g., Nash or correlated equilibrium) of the game. By contrast, we view the social network as a team that has a common opponent, the environment. Thus, our work can be viewed as an extension of the classical Bayesian economic theory of teams [32, 33] to the realm of online decision-making in the presence of Knightian uncertainty.
Some notation and preliminaries
Here, we provide some basic concepts and results that will be used later in the development. The total variation distance between any two distributions µ, ν ∈ P (X) is given by
The Kullback-Leibler divergence (or relative entropy) between µ and ν is
where supp(·) denotes the support of a probability distribution. The Kullback-Leibler divergence is nonnegative, i.e., D(µ µ) ≥ 0 for all µ, ν ∈ P (X), and positive definite, i.e., D(µ ν) = 0 if and only if µ = ν. (There are other properties, such as convexity, which we do not use in this paper. The reader is invited to consult any text on information theory, such as Cover and Thomas [10] , for more details.) These two quantities are related via the Csiszár-Kemperman-Kullback-Pinsker (CKKP) inequality [10, Lemma 17.
We will also need some concepts from statistical physics (see, e.g., [26] ). Any probability distribution µ ∈ P (X) defines a family of Gibbs distributions indexed by functions g : X → R:
In statistical physics, each x ∈ X is associated with a possible configuration of a physical system, and g : X → R is the negative energy function. In that context, Eq. (4) describes the probabilities of different configurations when the system with energy function g is in a state of equilibrium with a thermal environment at unit absolute temperature [26] . The following lemma (see, e.g., [26, Lemma V.1.4] for a slightly looser bound) provides some properties of Gibbs distributions that will be useful later on in the development of our main results: Lemma 1. Let g , h be any two real-valued functions on X. Then we have
and
where f s is the span seminorm (or oscillation) of a function f : X → R given by
The proof is elementary, so we give it in Appendix A for completeness.
The model and problem formulation
We model the social network by a simple undirected graph G = (V, E ), where each vertex v ∈ V is associated with an agent, and the edges {u, v} ∈ E indicate symmetric pairwise interactions (in particular, information exchange) among agents. For each v, we denote by ∂v u ∈ V : {u, v} ∈ E the set of neighbors of v, and let ∂ + v {v} ∪ ∂v denote the set consisting of agent v and all of its neighbors. The maximum degree of G is
Each agent takes actions in the base action set {1, . . . , q}. The elements of the set
will be referred to as network action profiles. For each v ∈ V , we fix a probability measure µ v,0 on {1, . . . , q}, and let µ 0 ∈ P (X) denote the product measure
for all x ∈ X.
We assume that each µ v,0 charges every action a ∈ {1, . . . , q}, i.e., µ v,0 (a) > 0 for all a. The probability measure µ v,0 describes the default individual behavior of agent v. Finally, we are given two classes of local cost functions: the class Φ of one-variable (vertex) costs φ : {1, . . . , q} → R and the class Ψ of twovariable (edge) costs ψ : {1, . . . , q} × {1, . . . , q} → R. With this, we denote by F = F Φ,Ψ the space of all functions f : X → R of the form
Parameters: base action set {1, . . . , q}; network graph G = (V, E ); default probability measures µ v,0 for all v ∈ V ; local function classes Φ, Ψ; number of rounds T ∈ N.
Initialization of information sets: for each v ∈ V , let I v,0 = ∅.
Initialization of actions: for each v ∈ V , draw X v,0 at random according to µ v,0 , independently of all other v's.
For each round t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
(1) An agent U t ∈ V is chosen uniformly at random.
(2) Agent U t draws a random action X U t ,t on the basis of its current information I U t ,t −1 ; all other agents v ∈ V \{U t } replay their most recent action:
and updates its information set to
, where ι v,t is the new information available to agent at time t (cf. Eq. (9)). where φ v ∈ Φ and ψ u,v ∈ Ψ for all v ∈ V and all {u, v} ∈ E . The interaction among the agents and the environment takes place according to the following protocol: Initially, each agent v ∈ V starts out with an empty information set I v,0 = ∅ and draws an action X v,0 ∈ {1, . . . , q} at random according to µ v,0 , independently of all other agents. At each discrete time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, a single agent U t ∈ V is activated uniformly at random independently of all other past data. This agent takes a random action X U t ,t on the basis of all information currently available to it, while all other agents v ∈ V \{U t } replay their actions from the previous time step t − 1. Once the network action profile X t = (X v,t : v ∈ V ) for time t is generated, each agent v observes its instantaneous cost function φ v,t , its instantaneous local-interaction cost functions ψ u,v,t for u ∈ ∂v, and the decisions of all its neighbors (of course, the agent knows its own decision X v,t ). Formally, each agent v ∈ V at time t observes ι v,t , where
and updates its information to
Here, (φ v,t ) v∈V and (ψ u,v,t ) {u,v}∈E are the local costs for each agent and for each pair of interacting edges that the environment has generated for time t . As we mentioned earlier, we assume that the environment is nonreactive, i.e., all the cost functions are fixed in advance but revealed to the agents sequentially. Figure 1 gives a summary of this process. Observe that the above process, where one agent updates its decision while the other agents replay their most recent decisions, is equivalent to the situation where one agent updates while the other agents do nothing. The decision update of the agent, however, triggers a change in the environment reflected through the instantaneous cost functions φ v,t ∈ Φ for all v and ψ u,v,t ∈ Ψ for all {u, v} ∈ E .
For each t = 1, . . . , T , let µ t denote the probability distribution of the network action profile X t .
fully specified given the initial condition µ 0 in (7) and the sequence of conditional probability distributions
where 1 {·} is an indicator function that takes value 1 when the logical predicate {·} is true and is 0 otherwise, I t = (I v,t : v ∈ V ) is all the information available immediately after time t , P v,t +1 (·|I v,t ) is the conditional distribution (or local stochastic update rule) according to which agent v draws its action x v,t +1 , while x −v,t is the (|V | − 1)-tuple obtained from x t by deleting the coordinate corresponding to agent v, i.e., x −v,t x u,t : u ∈ V \{v} . The instantaneous loss incurred by the network at time t is given by
is the instantaneous cost function for the entire network at time t . After T rounds, the regret of the network with respect to the sequence f 1 , .
where the superscript LI stands for "local interaction." The corresponding worst-case regret is
Our objective is to design the local stochastic update rules P v,t (·|I v,t ) for all v ∈ V and all t ∈ {1, . . . , T } to guarantee that the regret (11) is sublinear in T and polynomial in the inverse temperature parameter β, the number of basic actions q, the size |V | of the network, and the maximum number ∆ of each agent's neighbors in the social graph.
The main results
To motivate our design of a decentralized strategy, we start by developing a particular centralized scheme that, as we shall see, can be well-approximated with a natural distributed implementation. Consider a fixed but arbitrary sequence of instantaneous cost functions f 1 , . . . , f T ∈ F chosen by the environment. Our centralized strategy comes with a tunable parameter γ > 0, and is obtained by the following recursive construction. Suppose that the distributions π 1 , . . . , π t of the action profiles X 1 , . . . , X t have already been chosen. We choose the next π t +1 to balance the greedy tendency to minimize the most recent instantaneous loss ℓ t (·) = β〈·, f t 〉 + D(· µ 0 ) against the cautious tendency to stay close to what worked well in the past, i.e., π t . Hence, a good candidate for π t +1 is
where γ controls the trade-off between the greedy and the cautious behavior. This construction is reminiscent of the so-called mirror descent algorithms for online convex optimization [13, Chapter 11] , except that here the optimization is performed in the space of probability measures, and there is no linearization of the objective function. An application of the method of Lagrange multipliers leads to the following solution:
where Z t +1 is the normalization constant needed to ensure that π t +1 is a bona fide probability distribution.
Theorem 1.
The strategy (12) has the following properties:
1. For any T ∈ N and all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, the distribution π t +1 can be expressed in the following form:
whereZ t +1 is a normalization constant, F
0 ≡ 0, and
2. Suppose that the functions φ ∈ Φ and ψ ∈ Ψ take values in the interval
and we have the following bound on the worst-case regret:
where F = F Φ,Ψ and
Several observations are in order:
1. Inspection of the non-recursive form (13) of π t +1 sheds light on the role of the tunable parameter γ: at each time t , it is used to discount the influence of past instantaneous costs f 1 , . . . , f t at an exponential rate. In particular, the most recent scaled cost β f t enters with the maximum weight 1/(1+γ), while the very first scaled cost β f 1 has weight 1/(1+γ) t . As we will see later, this discounting is crucial in ensuring that we can approximate each global randomized strategy π t using purely local update rules.
2. The right-hand side of (16) is minimized if we choose
The resulting "parameter-free" regret bound
is linear in β and ∆, subquadratic in |V |, sublogarithmic in 1/θ, and sublinear in T .
3. From the standpoint of the influence of the initial distributions µ v,0 , the "parameter-free" regret bound in (17) is minimized when µ v,0 is the uniform distribution for all v ∈ V , resulting in
We now use this centralized scheme to construct appropriate local update rules P v,t +1 (·|I v,t ) for all v ∈ V and t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. For any cost function f of the form (8), any v ∈ V , and any boundary condition
, we define the local cost at v by
Similar notation will be used for time-indexed instantaneous and discounted cumulative costs, i.e., f v,t based on f t , or F
t . For each v ∈ V and each t , let
where the normalization constant now depends on the action profile x ∂v,t of the neighborhood of agent v after time t :
Note that the history of previous local action profiles x ∂v,1 , . . . , x ∂v,t enters into the conditional probabilities (18) only through the most recent action profile x ∂v,t . Moreover, if we consider a fixed but arbitrary sequence of network costs f 1 , . . . , f T , then we may simplify our notation by suppressing the dependence of the transition probabilities P v,t +1 (·|I v,t ) and P t +1 (·|I t ) on the costs f 1 , . . . , f t and past action profiles x 1 , . . . , x t −1 . Thus, instead of P v,t +1 (x t +1 |I v,t ), we will write
where we have also used the same convention for the local update rules P v,t +1 (·|I v,t ). So, when the instantaneous costs f 1 , . . . , f T are fixed, the network action profiles X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X T form a Markov chain with initial distribution µ 0 and time-inhomogeneous transition probabilities Pr(X t +1 = y|X t = x) = P t +1 (y|x).
One can recognize the Markov transition kernel P t +1 (x t +1 |x t ) constructed from (18) according to (10) as one step of the Glauber dynamics (or the Gibbs sampler) [17] [18] [19] induced by the Gibbs distribution π t +1 in (13) . Consequently, for each t we have the detailed balance (or time-reversibility) property
which implies that π t is an invariant distribution of P t (we give a self-contained proof of this fact in Appendix B). In mathematical economics and game theory, the Glauber dynamics was used by Blume [20] (under the name "log-linear learning") and by Young [21] (under the name "spatial adaptive play") to model the emergence of optimal global behavior in networks of agents with local interactions; see also a recent paper by Alós-Ferrer and Netzer [22] for a discussion of a more general class of logit-response dynamics that includes the Glauber dynamics as a special case.
Theorem 2. Suppose, as before, that all functions in Φ and Ψ take values in [−1, 1]. Suppose also that
∆β < 1 and β|V | 3 (∆ + 1)γ 1 − ∆β ≤ 1 4 .(21)
Then the strategy (18)-(19) based on the Glauber dynamics attains the following worst-case regret:
A few comments on the interpretation of the above result:
1. The two regularity conditions in (21) are needed to ensure that the sequence of action profile distributions µ 1 , . . . , µ T induced by the Glauber dynamics (18)- (19) closely tracks its centralized counterpart π 1 , . . . , π T from Theorem 1. The first condition is, essentially, a Dobrushin uniqueness condition from statistical physics (see, e.g., [26, Section V.1]), which is typically used to establish rapid mixing (i.e., convergence to the invariant distribution) of the Glauber dynamics [39, 40] . The correlation decay conditions driving the results of Gamarnik et al. [25] are similar in spirit. The second condition in (21) is needed to get the desired close tracking behavior as a consequence of the first condition and a uniform bound on the relative-entropy "step sizes" D(π t π t +1 ) from Theorem 1.
2. We note that β is a fixed exogenous parameter that quantifies the responsiveness of agents to changes in their environment (as reflected through the time-varying instantaneous costs), whereas γ is an endogenous parameter that can be tuned to optimize the regret. The first condition in (21) therefore involves only the intrinsic parameters of the network and says that the Glauber dynamics (18)- (19) is mixing whenever the temperature parameter 1/β is larger than the maximum number of neighbors of any agent. The second condition in (21), which involves also the endogenous parameter γ, appears to be rather restrictive as it requires γ to be bounded by a constant that is inversely proportional to |V | 3 . However, this can be mitigated by appropriately choosing γ as a function of the time horizon T . In particular, as we show below, this condition will be met provided T is sufficiently large but polynomial in |V |. This polynomial dependence of the critical T on the network parameters is also similar to the findings of Gamarnik et al. [25] in the context of static (offline) optimization problems.
3. While exact optimization of the right-hand side of (22) over γ appears to be difficult, we may get a suboptimal bound by choosing
This γ ♯ will satisfy the second condition in (21) , provided the time horizon T is sufficiently long:
In that case, the strategy (18)- (19) with γ = γ ♯ will attain the regret
We can express this bound more succinctly as
whereÕ(·) hides polylogarithmic factors. Compared to the optimized regret bound (17) in the centralized case, the local-information regret (23) has a worse dependence on the network parameters. This is not surprising since the local-information regret bound is for decentralized local strategies and it is obtained using a suboptimal choice for the parameter γ. Thus, the bound reflects the price of the decentralization of strategies, as well as the suboptimality of γ ♯ .
Proofs
The proofs of Theorem 1 and 2 are given in this section. Some auxiliary results that support the proofs are provided in Appendices A-C.
Proof of Theorem 1 Part 1.
The proof is by induction on t . The base case, t = 0, is
withZ 1 ≡ 1. Therefore, suppose (13) holds for a given t . Then, according to (12) we have
, where the last equality follows from the induction hypothesis. Since
it follows that
We can takeZ t +2 =Z 1 γ+1 t +1 Z t +2 , thus showing that (13) holds for t + 2. Hence, relation (13) is valid for all t ≥ 1.
Part 2. We start by writing down an exact expression for the regret R T ( f T
. For every t , we can use the definition (12) of π t +1 to write
Therefore, for any ν ∈ P (X),
where π T +1 is computed according 5 to (12) with t = T . In particular, letting ν = π t , we have
Therefore,
so by summing from t = 1 to t = T and using the fact that π 1 = µ 0 , we obtain
Since the divergence is nonnegative, we can bound the regret as
where we have used the fact that, because µ 0 (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X,
for any ν ∈ P (X). The next step is to bound the terms D(π t π t +1 ). To that end, it is convenient to use the form (13) , which expresses π t as a Gibbs measure. Thus, Lemma 1 gives
Now, we need to bound the span seminorm of F
To that end, we have from (24)
Hence,
Now, using the definition of F (γ) t −1 and Lemma C.1 in Appendix C, we have
Using (27) in (26), we get
which gives us (15) . Moreover, substituting this bound into Eq. (25), we obtain
Since this bound holds uniformly in all f 1 , . . . , f T ∈ F , we get (16).
Proof of Theorem 2
Before proceeding with the formal proof, let us briefly outline the intuition behind it. The underlying idea is to express the regret R 
, and the main effort of the proof is in establishing a bound on the total decentralization cost incurred over the time horizon T . In turn, this total decentralization cost depends on the distances between the centralized action profile distribution π t and its centralized counterpart µ t for t = 1, . . . , T . These distances turn out to be small due to the use of the Glauber dynamics.
More specifically, consider the centralized strategy {π t } T +1
t =0 given in (12) . By construction of the local update rules in (18) , each "global" probability measure π t is invariant with respect to the Markov transition kernel P t given in (19) . Moreover, as the relative entropy bound (15) shows, the probability measures π t and π t +1 are close for every t . Finally, we will show that, under the condition ∆β < 1, the conditional distributions P t (·|x) and P t (·|y) will be close whenever the action profiles x and y are close. As we will demonstrate shortly, these three properties together ensure that, at each time step t , the decentralized action profile distribution µ t = P t P t −1 . . . P 1 µ 0 will be close to its centralized counterpart π t . On a "big picture" level, this argument is similar in spirit to the one used by Narayanan and Rakhlin [41] to construct and analyze efficient algorithms for centralized online minimization of a sequence of linear functions on a compact convex subset of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. However, here we are interested in decentralized algorithms for discrete optimization. Moreover, the overall proof in [41] is rather technical, drawing on ideas from the Riemannian geometry of interior-point optimization algorithms [42] and random walks on convex bodies [43] . By contrast, our proof is much simpler, and relies on the notion of positive Ricci curvature of a Markov chain recently introduced by Ollivier [24] (the reader is invited to consult a recent paper by Joulin and Ollivier [44] for examples of how Ricci curvature ideas can be used to get sharp estimates of convergence rates of MCMC algorithms).
To separate out the key ideas underlying our proof, we have split this section into three parts. The first part (Section 4.2.1) uses the notion of Ricci curvature of Markov chains to obtain uniform error bounds for sampling from a time-varying sequence of probability measures. Because the results of this part may be of independent interest, we formulate them in a much more general setting of complete separable metric spaces. The second part (Section 4.2.2) applies these results to the time-varying Glauber dynamics (18)- (19) . Once all the necessary ingredients are in place, we complete the proof of Theorem 2 in the last part (Section 4.2.3).
Positive Ricci curvature and sampling from a time-varying sequence of probability measures
Let (X, ρ) be a complete separable metric space (i.e., a Polish space) equipped with the σ-algebra B(X) of its Borel subsets. A Markov transition kernel on X is a mapping P(·|·) : B(X) × X → [0, 1], such that (i) P(·|x) is a probability measure on X for all x and (ii) the mapping x → P(A|x) is measurable for every A ∈ B(X). We define the action of a Markov kernel P on a probability measure µ ∈ P (X) as
and we say that µ is P-invariant if µ = Pµ. The L 1 Wasserstein distance (or transportation distance) [45] between probability measures µ, ν ∈ P (X) is defined as
where C (µ, ν) denotes the collection of all couplings of µ and ν, i.e., all probability measures υ on X × X with marginals µ and ν. An important Kantorovich-Rubinstein theorem (see, e.g., [45, Theorem 1.14]) gives a variational representation of W 1 (µ, ν):
where the supremum is over all real-valued functions f on X with Lipschitz constant
Remark 1.
When ρ is the trivial metric, i.e., ρ(x, y) = 1 {x =y} , the Wasserstein distance is equal to the total variation distance: for any µ, ν ∈ P (X):
Moreover, for any two µ, ν ∈ P (X), we can construct the so-called optimal coupling υ ⋆ ∈ C (µ, ν) that achieves the infimum in (30) (see, e.g., [46, Section 4.2]).
Fix a Markov kernel P on X. Following Ollivier [24] , we say that P has positive Ricci curvature if there exists some κ ∈ (0, 1], such that
We will denote the supremum of all such κ by Ric(P) and call this number the Ricci curvature of P. The following contraction inequality [24, Proposition 20] is key: (31) holds for P with some κ ∈ (0, 1] if and only if
We are now ready to develop our main technical tool:
Lemma 2. Let P 1 , P 2 , . . . be a sequence of Markov kernels on X with the following properties:
(i) Each P t has a unique invariant distribution π t , and there exists some δ ∈ [0, 1), such that
(ii) The Ricci curvatures of the P t 's are uniformly bounded from below by some κ ⋆ > 0:
Given a probability measure µ 1 ∈ P (X), let {µ t } be a sequence of probability measures defined recursively via
Proof. For any t we have
where (35) is by the triangle inequality, (36) uses the recursive definition of the µ t 's and the P t -invariance of π t , and (37) uses the contraction inequality (32) and the assumption (33) . Using the initial condition W 1 (µ 0 , π 0 ) ≤ δ and the fact that κ ⋆ > 0, we arrive at (34).
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Lemma 2, for any Lipschitz function f
Proof. Use (34) and the Kantorovich-Rubinstein formula (29).
Positive Ricci curvature of the time-varying Glauber dynamics
We now particularize these results to our setting, where X is the space of all tuples x = (x v : v ∈ V ) equipped with the Hamming distance
In this case, the Ricci curvature bounds are equivalent to the so-called path coupling bounds of Bubley and Dyer [47] (see also [46, Chapter 14] ). In particular, in order to obtain a lower bound on the Ricci curvature of a given Markov kernel P, it suffices to consider only those x, y ∈ X with ρ H (x, y) = 1. Indeed, suppose that we can find some κ ∈ (0, 1], such that
for all x, y with ρ H (x, y) = 1. Then Ric(P) ≥ κ. To see this, consider any pair x, y ∈ X with ρ H (x, y) = k. Then, there exists a sequence x 1 , . . . , x k+1 ∈ X, such that x 1 = x, x k+1 = y, and ρ H (x j , x j +1 ) = 1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Using this fact, we can write
where the second step follows from the triangle inequality and the third step follows from (38) . Using this observation, we can prove the following:
Lemma 3. Let P 1 , . . . , P T +1 be the Markov kernels on X given by (19) , and let π 1 , . . . , π T +1 ∈ P (X) be the Gibbs measures defined in (13) . Suppose that ∆β < 1. Then the conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied with
Consequently,
Proof. The fact that each π t is invariant with respect to P t follows from the detailed balance property (20) . To keep the paper relatively self-contained, we give in Appendix B a short proof of (20) as a consequence of a more general result on the Gibbs sampler.
To upper-bound the Wasserstein distance W 1 (π t , π t +1 ), we write
where in the first line we have used the definition (28) of the Wasserstein distance, while the last step follows from the coupling representation (30) of the total variation distance. Furthermore, using (15) and the CKKP inequality (3), we get
Using this bound in (41), we get (39) . Finally, we obtain a uniform lower bound on the Ricci curvature of the P t 's. Each P t is of the form
Recalling the discussion preceding the statement of the lemma, we only need to consider pairs x, y with ρ H (x, y) = 1. Fix such a pair x, y, and let u ∈ V denote the single vertex at which they differ. We will construct a suitable coupling of P t (·|x) and P t (·|y). We define a random couple (X ,Ȳ ) ∈ X × X as follows.
Select a vertex v ∈ V uniformly at random. There are three cases to consider:
In this case, we draw a random sample A from P u,t (·|x ∂u ) and letX
• If v ∈ ∂u, then we sample (X v ,Ȳ v ) from the optimal coupling of P v,t (·|x ∂v ) and P v,t (·|y ∂v ) (cf. • If v ∈ ∂ + u, then x ∂v = y ∂v . We sample a random A from P v,t (·|x ∂v ) = P v,t (·|y ∂v ) and letX v =Ȳ v = A,
Letῡ denote the joint probability distribution of (X ,Ȳ ). It is easy to show thatX (respectively,Ȳ ) has distribution P t (·|x) (respectively, P t (·|y)). Therefore,ῡ is an element of C P t (·|x), P t (·|y) . Moreover,
It remains to bound η from above. To that end, we note that, for each v ∈ V , both P v,t (·|x ∂v ) and P v,t (·|y ∂v ) are Gibbs measures, cf. (43) . Therefore, using Lemma 1, we can write
Using Lemma C.1 in Appendix C and an argument similar to the one used to derive (27), we get
where in the last line we have used the fact that ρ H (x ∂v , y ∂v ) = 1, which in turn follows from the fact that x and y differ only at a single vertex. Substituting this into (44), we get η ≤ β. Therefore, from the definition (28) of W 1 it follows that
which gives us (40).
Completing the proof
We decompose the regret R
where the last step follows from Lemma 3. By our assumption (see Eq. (21)), the quantity in (47) is bounded by 1/4. Therefore,
where we have also used the fact that the function ξ → −ξ ln ξ is monotonically increasing on the interval [0, 1/e]. Substituting this bound into (46) and using (47) one more time, we get
.
Summing from t = 1 to t = T , we obtain
Combining this with the bound (16) from Theorem 1, we get
and the proof is complete.
Conclusion
We have studied a model of online (i.e., real-time) discrete optimization by a social network consisting of agents that must choose actions to balance their immediate time-varying costs against a tendency to act according to some default myopic strategy. The costs are generated by a dynamic environment, and the agents lack ability or incentive to construct an a priori model of the environment's evolution. The global cost of the network decomposes into a sum of individual and pairwise local-interaction terms and, at each time step, every agent is informed only about its own cost and the pairwise costs in its immediate neighborhood. These assumptions on the network and on the environment capture the socalled Knightian uncertainty [7] [8] [9] . The overall objective is to minimize the worst-case regret, i.e., the difference between the cumulative real-time performance of the network and the best performance that could have been achieved in hindsight with full centralized knowledge. We have constructed an explicit strategy for the network based on the Glauber dynamics and showed that it achieves favorable scaling of the regret in terms of problem parameters under a Dobrushin-type mixing condition. Our proof uses ideas from statistical physics, as well as recent developments in the theory of Markov chains in metric spaces, specifically Ollivier's notion of positive Ricci curvature of a Markov operator [24] .
Although the notion of regret is backward-looking, it is important conceptually since it quantifies the agents' ability to make forecasts even in the absence of a Bayesian model, and to improve their decisions over time. From the point of view of economics, regret minimization is significant for two reasons. First, it allows for boundedly rational agents. Second, it may be used as a basis for what Selten [48] has called a practically normative theory of economic behavior, since the goal of minimizing regret is synonymous with using past experience to improve one's decisions in the future, as opposed to following a strategy based on ideal rational expectations independent of the environment. In addition, in the online learning framework, the model of the interaction between the social network and the environment does not rely on probability judgments or assumptions about what will happen. Rather, probability is used as a tool to help the agents decide what to do -how to allocate priority to different actions? When to perform experimentation, and when to stick with a strategy that had performed well in the past? Thus, probability is used as an objective evolutionary mechanism for selecting an action [48, 49] , rather than as a subjective belief about the environment. This viewpoint is, of course, ideally suited for a Knightian theory of decision-making, and it meshes well with post-Keynesian critiques of the use of probability to quantify uncertainty [50, 51] .
A Proof of Lemma 1
All Gibbs measures µ g induced by the same base measure µ have the same support as µ. Therefore, the quantity D(µ g µ h ) is finite for all functions g and h on X, and
We now use the well-known Hoeffding bound [52] , which for our purposes can be stated as follows: for any function F : X → R and any ν ∈ P (X), ln〈ν, exp(F )〉 ≤ 〈ν, F 〉 + F Applying (A.2) to the second term in (A.1), we note that the terms involving the expectation of g − h with respect to µ g cancel, and we are left with (5) . The bound (6) follows from (5) and the CKKP inequality (3).
B Gibbs sampler and detailed balance
In order to keep the paper self-contained, we give a brief proof of the detailed balance property of the discrete-state Gibbs sampler [19] . Consider an arbitrary everywhere positive probability measure π ∈ P (X) and a random variable X = (X v ) v∈V with distribution π. For any v ∈ V , the conditional probability that X v = x v given X −v = x −v is equal to 
= π(y)P(x|y).
A simple calculation shows that when π = µ f for a Gibbs measure µ f induced by an everywhere positive product measure µ ∈ P (X) and any function f ∈ F , the conditional measure π v (·|x −v ) for any v ∈ V has the form
This, in turn, implies the detailed balance property (20) . 
